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NOTES
WHEN IS A SALE A SALE?
Plaintiff contracted for defendant to furnish and install
commercial grade wall-to-wall carpeting in plaintiff's bowling
alley. Some three months after the installation was completed
the carpet began to show signs of excessive wear. Eighteen
months later, plaintiff brought suit in redhibition for return
of the purchase price and other damages. The district court
accepted defendant's plea of one year prescription for such an
action and dismissed the suit. Held, plaintiff's petition alleged
a breach of a contract to furnish and install wall-to-wall carpet-
ing which constituted a contract of construction, or for work
by the job, rather than a sale, and therefore the applicable pre-
scriptive period was ten years. Kegler's, Inc. v. Levy, 239 So.2d
450 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
The problem of differentiating sales and construction con-
tracts (or similar contracts calling for work and labor) is a re-
curring one in the jurisprudence, and the answers given seldom
lend themselves to uniformity.' The question involves many
aspects of the rights and remedies of the parties to the contract; it
is important not only in determining prescription, 2 but also in
measuring damages3 and determining upon which party the risk
or loss or damage lies.4 A further significance of proper classi-
fication of the transaction lies in defining the security interest
1. All of the following cases have been held to be sales: Hinnricks v.
Monteleone, 51 La. Ann. 896, 25 So. 546 (1899) (construction of immovable
showcases); Hunt v. Suares, 9 La. 434 (1836) (installed mantle pieces);
S & W Investment Co. v. Otis Sharp, Inc., 162 So.2d 171 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964) (swimming pool and accessory equipment); Brown v. Sanders, 149
So.2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) (central heating system); Ziblich v. Metry
Upholstery, Inc., 148 So.2d 436 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) (draperies); Dugue
v. Safety Oil Burners, Inc., 142 So. 161 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932) (automatic
oil burner).
In contrast, the following have been held to represent construction con-
tracts: Airco Refrigeration Service, Inc. v. Fink, 242 La. 73, 134 So.2d 880
(1961) (installation of contractee's air conditioner); Rocquin v. Simmons,
187 So.2d 472 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966) (landscaping); Federico v. Kratzberg,
163 So.2d 843 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) (remodeling); Southern Patio, Inc. v.
Varnado, 153 So.2d 924 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) (aluminum siding); Papa v.
Louisiana Metal Awning Co., 131 So.2d 114 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) (patio
cover); Ducore v. Gross, 110 So.2d 752 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1959) (draperies);
Mangin v. Jorgens, 24 So.2d 384 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946) (automatic oil
burner system).
2. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2534, 2546, 2769, 3544.
3. Id. arts. 2531, 2545, 2769.
4. Id. arts. 2467, 2758, 2760.
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of the transferor.5 Although the Civil Code clearly contemplates
the distinction between these types of contracts, it defines the
contract of sale only in the most general terms.0 Thus, the prob-
lem of categorizing a particular transaction has generally been
left to the courts.
One of the earliest, and most commonly cited, cases in this
area is Hunt v. Suares.7 In determining the nature of a contract
to furnish and install mantle pieces, the court construed "the
principal contract [as] one of sale of the mantle pieces ready
made, and.., the agreement to put them up and furnish materials
for that purpose, does not take the contract as to the mantle
pieces out of the rule which governs that species of contract
.... 11 In a similar vein, the court in Papa v. Louisiana Metal
Awning Co. found a contract for the installation of a covered
patio to be a construction contract since "this contract involved
more than a mere sale of materials. It involved primarily the
furnishing of labor and the contractor's skill in the performance
of the job."'10
Beyond this, the courts have reached decisions that seem
unclear, and occasionally even contradictory. Contracts to fur-
nish and install oil burners have been held to be both a sale
1
'
"and part of a contract to construct a heating system."' 2 Con-
tracts to install draperies likewise have been termed both con-
struction contracts'3 and sales.' 4 However, certain principal fea-
tures of each category of contract are generally recognized.
Commenting on this subject, one author has said,
5. See note 22 infra.
6. LA. Cirv. CODE art. 2439. In this connection, id. art. 1945 is significant:
"Legal agreements having the effect of law upon the parties, none but the
parties can abrogate or modify them. Upon this principle are established
the following rules:
"Second-That courts are bound to give legal effect to all such con-
tracts according to the true intent of all the parties."
7. 9 La. 434 (1836).
8. Id. at 436.
9. 131 So.2d 114 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
10. Id. at 117.
11. Dugue v. Safety Oil Burners, Inc., 142 So. 161 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1932).
12. Mangin v. Jorgens, 24 So.2d 384 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946). Dugue
was distinguished by the court on the grounds that, in that case, the burner
was to be attached to an existing system, and article 2769 was not pleaded.
13. Ducore v. Gross, 110 So.2d 752 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1959).
14. Ziblich v. Metry Upholstery, Inc., 148 So.2d 436 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963).
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"The principle of weighing the price of the article installed
together with the cost and amount of labor and skill involved
seems to be the most reasonable way to ascertain the actual
intention of the parties with regard to the nature of the
contract.' 15
This statement reflects the traditional test applied by the courts
in approaching such problems. Further, it would appear to have
received legislative recognition in the language of the sales tax
statutes which define sales price as including any incidental ser-
vices which are a part of the sale.16 It would also be in accord
with the "essence" test which prevails in common law jurisdic-
tions.17
In reaching its decision in the instant case, the court, rather
than relying on jurisprudence, cited articles 2439, 2456, 2467 and
2475 of the Civil Code. Two prominent factors in the court's
reasoning are apparent, however: The carpeting, although part
of the manufacturer's stock in trade, had to be woven especially
for the plaintiff, and the installation was of a relatively perma-
nent nature.
First, the court emphasized the unusual design of the car-
pet, and that the defendant had to have it specially made by the
manufacturer. This argument is not without precedent. In com-
mon law jurisdictions, states following the "New York Rule"
hold that contracts for goods to be made in the future are con-
tracts for services, not sales.18 However, the majority of states
follow the "Massachusetts Rule," which limits this result to cases
in which the product is not of a type normally produced by the
15. Comment, 7 LA. L. Rsv. 564, 565-66 (1947).
16. LA. R.S. 47:301(13) (1950). In Griffin & Zimmer Contracting Co. v.
Mouton, 231 So.2d 644 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), this was held to encompass
labor incident to fashioning willow mattresses for a bridge foundation.
17. Clay v. Yates, 156 Eng. Rep. 1123 (C.P. 1856). This case furnishes
a succinct statement of the "essence test." Holding that a printer's contract
to publish books was a contract for services, the court stated that the most
significant factor was "whether work is the essence of the contract or
whether It is the materials supplied . . . ." Id. at 1124. A similar case, Lee
v. Griffin, 30 L.J. Q.B. 252 (1861), probably reveals more about the state
of dentistry at the time than the state of the law. Holding a contract to fit
false teeth to be a sale, the court made the point that "there can hardly be
said to be more skill in fitting teeth than in fitting a pair of breeches."
1d. at 254. See Note, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 803 (1954).
18. Crookshank v. Burrell, 18 Johnson (N.Y.) 58 (1820). For a discussion
of this point and a compilation of cases, see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 672, 681,
714 (1950).
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manufacturer. 0 Reason would seem to follow the latter rule;
it would certainly be ludicrous to argue that a person who
ordered an automobile from the factory had contracted for the
"construction" of his car. On this point, it is significant to note
that the agreement of the parties called for a "stock, commercial
carpet, '20 and that the manufacturer specialized in making car-
pets of this type for the commercial market.
Second, the court exhibited concern for the fact that the
carpet had to be cut to measure and semi-permanently installed.
Although return of the goods sold is normally expected in cases
of redhibition, the jurisprudence has long held that this is not
a necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of such an action.21
At any rate, since the plaintiff clearly planned to replace the
carpet, it could hardly be maintained that return of the carpet
was impossible. 22
In the final argument, the court addressed itself directly to
the factors that differentiate sales and constructions. It was
noted that more than a simple sale was involved, since the car-
pet had to be laid, cut, and seamed. Such factors are significant,
but their mere presence cannot suffice to alter the principal
nature of the contract. The proper test, and the traditional test,
would be to determine whether defendant's services or the car-
pet itself constituted the principal value of the contract. This,
however, is only an initial, mechanical inquiry; the ultimate
problem that must always be resolved is whether the services
involved in the contract are only incidental to the transfer of
ownership, or the principal object of the contract. In close cases,
19. Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450 (1874). See Note, 3 BOSTON U. L.
REv. 43 (1923); Comment, 20 HARv. L. Rzv. 363 (1906).
20. Kegler's, Inc. v. Levy, 239 So.2d 450, 454 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
21. Chapman v. Matthews, 18 La. Ann. 118 (1866); Lewis v. Morgan, 14
La. Ann. 401 (1859); George v. Moses Greenwood & Co., 11 La. Ann. 299
(1856); Smith v. Taylor, 10 Rob. 133 (La. 1845); Hivert v. Lacaze, 3 Rob. 357
(La. 1842); Alan Randal Co. v. Quality Oil Co., 100 So.2d 282 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1958).
22. This argument may point toward deeper concerns. Principally, the
court seems to note that carpeting may become an immovable by destination
after installation. The effect of this classification is largely on the security
of the vendor. Of course, It would not be feasible in such circumstances
for the vendor to reclaim his goods. However, immobilization does not
affect his right to sequester his share of the proceeds from the sale of the
thing rendered immovable. Immobilization per se should not determine the
nature of the contract, although It can be of probative value in determining
the principal object or major value of the contract. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 468,
3227; LA. CODS Civ. P. art. 1092. For an elaborate discussion of this area of
the law, see 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAw TREATISE § 49 (1967).
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the doubt should be resolved in favor of the classification that
yields the longer prescriptive period. In the instant case, it is
difficult to conceive how the labor involved could outweigh the
value of a commercial grade, all-wool carpet. The court should
have required a factual determination of the relative value of
these elements in the total contract price.2
At least insofar as the applicable prescriptive period is con-
cerned, the court's decision may be sustainable in an alternate
interpretation of the facts. By removing the contract under ques-
tion from the realm of sales, the court precluded the necessity
of determining the particular nature of the flaw, since the pre-
scriptive period for such construction contracts is ten years in
all cases. Testimony cited with approval by the court indicates
that the problem arose from a defect in manufacture, which
would clearly be a redhibitory vice. However, shortly after mak-
ing this observation, the court concluded that the "defendant did
not supply the quality of carpeting and padding he contracted
to furnish and install ... .1,24 This would seem to indicate that
the carpet as a whole did not meet the specifications called for
by the contract.
Article 2529 of the Civil Code states that "[a] declaration
made in good faith by the seller, that the thing sold has some
quality which it is found not to have, gives rise to a redhibi-
tion ... ." Thus, whether the problem here was a defect in manu-
facture or non-conforming goods, this article would seem to
indicate that the vice was a redhibitory one on which prescrip-
tion ran in one year.25 However, it can be argued that the re-
dactors of the Civil Code here used the term "redhibition" in
2529 with more of an eye to its etymological origins than its
classical legal definition, and meant simply "a returning." Thus,
in the case of non-conforming goods, as opposed to defects in
manufacture, the one-year prescriptive period peculiar to red-
23. See plaintiff's petition for rehearing, La. App. 4th Cir. Docket no.
3356 (August 17, 1970). In his petition, plaintiff alleged that out of a total
contract price of $11,165, labor amounted to not more than $654.28.
24. Kegler's, Inc. v. Levy, 239 So.2d 450, 455 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
25. "When declarations of quality are involved, it might be better to
restrict the application of the rules of redhibition to cases where the decla-
ration is made with respect to specified goods identified otherwise than by
their quality. This would mean that when the seller contracts to deliver
goods of a stated quality, the delivery of goods of a different quality would
constitute a breach of contract." The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Particular Contracts, 27 LA. L. Rsv. 465,
466-67 (1967).
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hibition is inapplicable. This argument was rejected by our
supreme court in the case of George v. Shreveport Cotton Oil
Co., 26 but a more recent appellate decision, Victory Oil Co. v.
Perret,27 reached the opposite conclusion on facts which appear
indistinguishable. The fact that writs were denied in this case
could mean that the supreme court no longer adheres to the
position taken in the George case. At any rate, reason and fair-
ness would seem to favor the Victory Oil opinion. Thus, while
it is submitted that the result ultimately reached by the court in
the instant case is correct, the decision could have been based
soundly on an interpretation of article 2529 which would conform
with the decision in the Victory Oil case. Such an opinion would
be more persuasive than the court's uneasy classification of this
contract as one for construction.
It is noteworthy that article 2529 has no counterpart in the
French Civil Code. French cases involving contracts in which
the goods delivered are not of the quality ordered treat the prob-
lem as an implied error in the contract, for which the applicable
prescriptive period is ten years.28 A French court deciding the
present case would presumably find such error present, assuming
that the carpet delivered was not of the quality contemplated.
Returning to the question of the nature of the contract under
question, there are two analogous cases which are of interest. In
Ducore v. Gross,29 an interior decorator's contract to furnish and
install draperies fabricated for him by a third party was held
to be a construction contract. This decision would appear to give
some support to the instant case. However, four years later in
Ziblich v. Metry Upholstery, Inc.,80 the same court held that a
similar contract in which the defendant actually fabricated the
draperies was a sale. Ducore v. Gross was not cited in the court's
opinion. Superficially, it would appear that these two cases are
irreconcilable. However, it is submitted that both could quite
26. 114 La. 498, 38 So. 432 (1905). Delivery of an improper grade of cot-
ton oil cakes, unsuitable for plaintiff's needs, was held to give rise to an
action in redhibition.
27. 183 So.2d 360 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 249 La. 65, 184 So.2d
735 (1966). In this case, the court held that the plaintiff had breached his
contract by delivering diesel oil of a lower grade than contracted for. See
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Par-
ticular Contracts, 27 LA. LAw REv. 465, 466 (1967).
28. 2 PLAm0L, CIVIL LAw TPEArlss no. 1467 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
29. 110 So.2d 752 (La. App. 4th Cir 1959).
30. 148 So.2d 436 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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likely be correct. The distinction could lie in the quality of the
materials, the expertise of the maker, or the overall nature of
the fabricator's business. In such an area of the law, dogmatic
classifications and mechanical tests should be avoided.
The two traditional tests of our law, principal value and
intent of the parties, provide a sound vehicle for proper deter-
mination of the nature of the contract. Through their interplay,
they can provide a reliable determination of the essence of the
contract. It is to be hoped that courts passing on similar ques-
tions in the future will more carefully develop and elaborate the
peculiar facts of the case. It is even conceivable that the present
case could be justified by a more complete factual determination.
As reported, however, Kegler's, Inc. v. Levy only confuses an
already uncertain area of our law.
John Franklin Weeks
LOUISIANA'S STATUTORY WILL:
THE ROLE OF FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
The attestation clause of the contested statutory will' was
dated "October-, 1966." Finding no general principle at either
civil or common law which required that testaments be dated,
the supreme court reasoned that unless specifically required by
statute the date of execution need not be included in the instru-
ment. The court held,2 that the testament was a valid statutory
will because, when a statutory will is incompletely dated, the
date of execution may be established by ordinary proof. Succes-
sion of Gordon, 257 La. 1086, 245 So.2d 319 (1971).
By creating the statutory will,8 the legislature established
1. Provided for under the terms of LA. R.S. 9:2442-2443 (Supp. 1964),
commonly referred to as the Louisiana Wills Statute.
2. Justice Barham authored the majority opinion with one justice con-
curring, two justices concurring in the decree, one justice dissenting, and
one justice recused.
3. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1964): "In addition to the methods provided in
the Louisiana Civil Code, a will shall be valid if in writing (whether type-
written, printed, mimeographed, or written in any other manner), and signed
by the testator in the presence of a notary public and two witnesses in the
following manner:
"(1) In the presence of the notary and both witnesses the testator shall
signify to them that the instrument is his will and shall sign his name on
each separate sheet of the instrument. If, however, the testator declares
that he is not able to sign his name because of some physical infirmity,
express mention of his declaration and of the cause that hinders him from
[Vol. 32
